My predictions:
1)
Amr Moussa
2)
Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh
3)
Ahmed Shafik
4)
Mohamed Morsi
5)
Hamdeen Sabahi (although I didn’t even feel the
need to mention his name in my previous post because I thought he had no
chance)
How it turned out:
1)
Mohamed Morsi
2)
Ahmed Shafik
3)
Hamdeen Sabahi
4)
Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh
5)
Amr Moussa
And that, my friends, demonstrates the futility of making
predictions about anything relating to politics in Egypt!
For many people in Egypt – revolutionaries and liberals in
particular – yesterday was a pretty terrible day. Of all the possible runoff
matchups, a Mohamed Morsi (Muslim Brotherhood) / Ahmed Shafik (Mubarak regime)
showdown is the most extreme, polarizing scenario. From talking to my friends
yesterday, reading reactions on Facebook and Twitter, and watching a few
television talk shows, it seems like most of the young, technology-literate
crowd is going to end up voting for the Muslim Brotherhood’s Morsi (albeit
while holding their noses). Despite all the fervid talk of being forced to
choose between “religious fascists” and “military fascists,” the thought of
voting for someone from the old regime to avoid the scenario of having an MB-dominated
government is simply unthinkable. Given the Morsi’s strong MB base and the
support he will likely receive from moderate Islamists and Salafis who
supported Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh and liberals who supported Sabbahi, it’s
hard for me to envision a scenario in which Shafik (who will be looking to
attract votes from former Amr Moussa supporters) wins the presidency. If the
liberals decide that it is not worth voting, however, then it is anybody’s
guess as to who will pull through in the end.
If there is a bright side to this situation, it is that a
Muslim Brotherhood-dominated government may result in one of two possible
positive outcomes. First, with the legislative and executive branches under
their control, the MB will be well-positioned to make a serious effort to bring
the military under the government’s control. The military will not easily
submit to government oversight of its budget and economic holdings, but this
issue is without a doubt one of the most important ones that Egypt faces today.
The Muslim Brotherhood may choose to cut a deal with the military in which they
essentially agree to stay out of each others’ business, but, even if such a
deal were to happen, their conflicting interests may eventually become so acute
that they have no choice but to confront each other. Second, with the entire
civilian government under its control, the MB will bear complete responsibility
for what happens in Egypt over the next several years. Given the current
economic crisis, the lack of a constitution, and the crippling of state
institutions such as the police force to the point where they have become
completely ineffective, this complete responsibility may turn into a curse instead
of a blessing. Assuming that the MB allows for free and fair elections a few
years down the road, Egyptians will have a chance to toss them out of power if
they are unhappy with the direction the country has taken under the MB’s
leadership.
On the other hand, the nightmare scenario for liberals is
that the brotherhood uses its newfound power to reorient the old system to
serve their own interests rather than reform it. If it so desires, the MB could
adopt many of the old constitutional and legal tools that Mubarak used to
consolidate his power and effectively minimize all political opposition. In my
opinion, such a move wouldn’t lead to a theocracy, as many people fear, but it
would result in the MB becoming the new version of the Mubarak regime.
A few other observations from yesterday:
1)
What was the main reason for the Muslim
Brotherhood’s success? Its ground game! There is simply no better political
organization in Egypt right now in terms of mobilizing its base and making sure
that its supporters have a way to get to the polls. A friend of mine who lives
in a small town in the Nile Delta, for example, told me that the MB had 15
tuk-tuks (rickshaw taxis) and 5 microbuses bringing people to the polls all day
long.
2)
Hamdeen Sabbahi’s popularity shot up in the last
few weeks as he took on the title of “revolutionary candidate.” I didn’t
include him in my post a few days
ago because I figured that, even though a number of my friends supported him,
his popularity would be limited to the educated, urban middle and upper
classes. As the parliamentary elections proved, these classes have relatively
little voting power compared to the Islamists. Nevertheless, Sabbahi’s strong
showing (as well as Aboul Fotouh’s) is one positive thing that the liberals can
take away from this otherwise dark day. Of course Sabbahi, Aboul Fotouh, and
the other liberal candidates are now regretting their decision not to unite
around one consensus choice – if they had done so, they would have had one of
their own in the runoff.
3)
Whence the Salafis? After their surprisingly
strong showing in the parliamentary elections, the Salafis (hardline Islamic
fundamentalists) didn’t field a candidate in the presidential elections. While
a number of Salafi groups supported Aboul Fotouh, they clearly did not turn out
as strongly for him as hoped. There is no way that the Salafis would support
Shafik, an avowed Islamist-hater, in the runoff, but it is unclear if they will
come out in large numbers to support Morsi. The Salafis and MB are intense
competitors when it comes to fighting for control over the state’s religious
and educational institutions, and the Salafis generally view the MB as having
deviated from the true Islam in favor of pragmatism and compromise in attempt to
gain political power. Hoping to gain some insight into the Salafi take on the
current political situation, a few friends and I went to hear the Friday sermon
at a popular Salafi mosque on the outskirts of Cairo yesterday. I was surprised
to hear the sheikh directly criticize the democratic process as a whole (and
elections in particular) as un-Islamic, basically arguing that splitting into
political parties and competing in elections runs counter to the Quran’s call
for unity among Muslims. While nearly all of the Salafis shared this view
before the revolution, many of them abandoned it after the revolution and dove
headfirst into the political sphere. There has been some evidence, however, that some of them may be reconsidering that
decision. Given that Salafis make up 20-25% of the electorate, this will be an important
constituency to watch over the next few weeks.
Suffice it to say that there will be plenty of intriguing
developments between now and the runoff on June 17th and 18th.
In light of my completely erroneous previous prediction for how things would
shake out, I realize that I have very little credibility with which to predict
the winner of the runoff. For what it’s worth, though, I think that Mohamed
Morsi will be Egypt’s first democratically-elected president.
Today is my last day in Egypt, so this post will likely be
my last (at least for now). To say that I’ve had a fascinating year here would
be an understatement. Egypt is a colorful, amazing, and frustrating place all
at the same time, and I hope that I have managed to convey at least a little
bit of that unique character through this blog. Thanks for reading, and
inshallah (God willing) I’ll be back here before long.
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